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RECENT CASES
ADVERSE POSSESSION -

BOUNDARIES

-

EXTENSION OF BOUNDARIES OR FENCES -

MISTAKE AS TO

Defendants had occupied and worked land up to a concrete

wall and rockery since May 28, 1949. Their grantor, mother of one of the
defendants, occupied and claimed the whole lot to the wall )rom 1926
to 1949. Plaintiff recognized the wall as the true boundary until a 1952
survey showed that the wall encroached on plaintiff's lot approximately nine
inches for the length of the boundary. The supreme court held, that where
real property is occupied continuously under intentional claim of right for
the statutory period of ten years, to a barrier thought to be the true
boundary, it is held adversely. Niven v. Sheehan, 278 P.2d 748 (Wash. 1955).
The rule that possession for the statutory period under claim of right'
due to mistake ripens into title by adverse possession has been applied in
other states with varying restrictions as to requirements of proof of hostile
intent to hold against the true owner. 2 Courts requiring proof of hostile
intent argue that without such intent the possessor holds the land in implied
subordination to the true owner. 3 Consequently; there is a presumption that
the claimant receives title to no more land than is actually his own unless
he has a positive and intentional hostile claim against the property of his
neighbor. 4 Therefore, in order to refute the presumption of subordination he
must unequivocably claim all the land within the tract he fences, maintains
and occupies.5
Courts that do not require a claimant to prove his intent to hold against
a true owner reason that an enclosure and maintenance of a parcel by a
claimant for the statutory period, believing the property to be his, is a
holding intended to exclude all others including the true owner 6 The
claimant, not realizing his enclosure exceeds the limits of his deed, naturally
defends the entire tract with uniform vigor.
Which class of claimants has the better right to protection from the
courts: claimants entering and holding with a consicous disregard of any
adverse rights, or claimants who mistakenly believe all the tract they hold
is their own? Manifestly, the wrongful taker's rights should not be protected
where those of an innocently mistaken holder would be unprotected7 The
requirement of proof of intent protects wrongfully hostile claimants and those

1. Peters v. Gilland, 186 S.W.2d 1019 (Tex

Civ. App. 1945) (claim of right is hold-

ing in belief that the land occupied belongs to the possessor); Young v. Newboro, 32
Wash.2d 141, 200 P.2d 975, 976 (1948) (dictum).
2. There are states holding that the claimant must prove his hostile intent.
E.g.,
Urschel v. Garcia, 164 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Steinbruck v. Babb, 148 Kan.
688, 84 P.2d 907 (1938)
(goes even further, requiring notice to the true owner of
hostile intent).
Certain states raise presumptions in favor of the true owner; Yor example,
that occupat'on by anyone but the true owner is in subordination to the true owner.
Winn v. Ab'les, 25 Kan. 85, 10 Pac. 443 (1886); Morgan v. Jenson, 47 N.D. 137, 142,
181 N.W. 89, 90 (1921) (dictum). Contra, see Rountree v. Jackson, 242 Ala. 190, 4 So.2d
743, 746 (1941); Cooper v. Tarpley, 112 Ind. App. 1, 41 N.E.2d 640, 643 (1942). See 4
Tiffany, Real Property §1159 (3d ed. 1939) (on this topic generally).
3. Peterson v. Sucro, .101 F.2d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 1939) (dictum) (interpreting North
Carolina law).

4. Ibid.
5. Guy v. Lancaster, 250 Ala. 226, 34 So.2d 10 (1948).
6. Stephens v. Clark, 211 N. C. 84, 189 S.E. 191, 195 (1937)
7. See 4 Tiffany, Real Property §1144 (3d ed. 1939).

(dictum).

RECENT CASES

willing to perjure themselves as to their true intentions, and denies protection
to. honestly mistaken takers who testify in good faith.8
Generally, a claim must be supported by acts plainly indicating an intent
to claim.0 Among conditions which will negative an intent to claim in any
jurisdiction are: an agreement that the mistaken boundary is temporary and
not the true line;10 or a disavowal of claim by an expression of willingness
to return the property to the true owner."'
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has never decided whether a claimant to real property held as a result of a mistaken boundary must prove his
hostile intent to acquire title.la Of course, the other requirements of adverse
possession, viz., that it be open, actual, notorious, exclusive, continuous and
uninterrupted must concurrently exist with the claim of right. 1 3 A North
Dakota statute further provides that the land occupied must be substantially
enclosed or that it must be cultivated or improved.14 The North Dakota Court
has decided that the claimant, ". . . must unmistakably indicate an assertion
of claim of exclusive ownership,"' 1 and that, ". . . every reasonable intendment should be made in favor of the true owner."' t 6 Thus it appears that in
North Dakota a mistaken adverse claimant would have to prove his hostile
intent to claim. 1 7 It is submitted that both logic and reason support the
contrary rule; therefore in claims of adverse possession due to mistake in
boundaries hostility should be presumed.18
KIRK B. SMITH

AUTOMOBILES

-

CONDITIONAL

SALES -

VENDOR'S LIABILITY FOR TORTS OF

Plaintiff insurance company issued a garage-liability policy to a
conditional vendor, and thereafter brought an action for a declaration of nonliability in regard to an automobile collision caused by the negligence of a
defendant, a conditional vendee. It was held that an automobile dealer who
purchased a used automobile and resold it under a conditional sales contract
was not an "owner" within the meaning of Iowa Owner's Responsibility Law, 1
VENDEE

-

8. Despite logic favoring a presumptiont of hostility, many courts maintain that a
possessor must prove his hostile intent to claim. Winn v. Abeles, 25 Kan. 85, 10 Pac.
433 (1886); Yatezak v. Cloon, 313 Mich. 854, 22 N.W.2d 113 (1949); Missouri City

Coal Co. v. Walker, 188 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1945); cf., Anson v. Tietze, 354 Mo. 553,
190 S.W.2d 193 (1945) (after claimant set forth a prima facia possessory case, it devolved upon the title holder to come forth with the evidence).
9. O'Brien v. Schultz, 278 P.2d 322 (Wash. 1954).

10. Beck v. Loveland, 37 Wash.2d 249, 222 P.2d 1066 (1950).
11. Bell v. Barrett, 76 S.W.2d 395 (Mo. 193.1); O'Brien v. Schultz, 278, P.2d

322, 329

(Wash. 1954)

(dictum).

12. But see Bernier v. Preckel, 60 N.D. 549, 555, 236 N.W. 243, 246 (1931)

("acqui-

esence" and "adverse possession" used synonomously); Patton, 3 Am. Law. Prop. §15.2.

13. Rovenko v. Bukovoy, 77 N. D. 741, 754, 45 N.W.2d 493, 499 (1950) (dictum).
14. N. D. Rev. Code §28-0111 (1943).
15. Enderlin Investmen Co. v. Nordhaugen, 18 N. D. 517, 524, 123 N.W. 390,
392 (1909) (dictum).
16. Rovenko v. Bukovoy, 77 N..D. 741, 753, 45 N.W.2d 493, 498 (1950) (dictum)..
17. But see Bernier v. Preckel, 60 N. D. 549, 555, 236, N.W. 243, 246 (1931).
18. For a well reasoned discussion of statutory adverse possession, see. Sullivan v.
Groves, 42 S.D. 60. 172 N.W. 926 (1919) (note especially the concurring opinion of
Whiting, J. at 930, and the similarity of New York Code of Civil Procedure §372 (1880),

now New York Civil Practice Act §40 (1939). to N. D. Rev. Code §28-0111 (1943).
1. Iowa Code 1950, §321.1(36) "Owner means a person who holds the legal title of
a vehicle or in the event a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale
or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated "n
the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee

